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Composite Warfare and the Amphibians
In the last decade a daunting problem has surfaced to face our naval communities.
How In addition, we examine one prominent alternative offered by Third Fleet, a solution as well known among naval theorists as it is profoundly misguided.
We offer an alternative which avoids the pitfalls not only of Third Fleet's proposal, but of historical experience which predates the Composite Warfare Concept.
Key to a sympathetic grasp of our proposal is an "untrammeled view of Composite Warfare and amphibious doctrine. We begin, then, by presenting the basic tenets of these doctrines.
The The authority delegated to these functional commanders, extending to functions rather than just to vessels, cuts across deck lines. An anti-submarine warfare commander, for instance, commands anti-submarine assets in the battle 9-7 group even though they m~.y ncr. ~1.11 t~e:_-icO 11aris shi1P.
Similarly for the anti-;.-*r w. i .~coruciander, and so on. 
Current doctrine for the
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THE COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMAND STRUCTURE
Complicating the picture somewhat are the variolis coordinators. While they lack the tactical authority extended to the warfare commanders, they are responsible for coordinating the employment of a battle group's assets in a particular area. Some of these coordinators are:
Helicopter Element Coo~rdinator (HEC) October.
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To accomplish this, Third Fleet was organized as a strategic defense and strike force.
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, In fact, he was pursuing a decoy, a hollow force designed to draw off the American fleet covering the landings. doctrine can hardly be judged inadequate on the basis of these two latter operations because it was never invoked.
Even so, the tensions that marked WWII amphibious campaigns were also present in Grenada and Beirut.
In presenting a solution to this problem of integrating amphibious forces and pure naval forces we have included one salient lesson: the persistent tension between the "blue water" and the "green water" navy. It is here, in this tension between amphibians and naval battle groups, that the root of this problem lies.
Conflict between the Composite Warfare Concept and amphibious doctrine is only the most recent manifestation
of long-standing differences in tactical perspective between these two communities. Until this source of our problem is recognized, we will continue to treat the symptoms instead of the disease.
One solution which treats symptoms is that of Third This proposal has at least three serious defects. The title "AMWC" was replaced by "CATF" and the billet of "COMMARFOR", senior to the LGC and co-equal to the OTC, was instituted. Yet even with this revision, the second TACMEMO falls victim to weighty objections, chief among which is the abandonment of unity of command.
In any event, by failing to consider the lessons of history the Third Fleet incorporates fatal defects in its proposal, the very defects our proposal avoids.
9-27 destruction or attenuation of hostile sea-denial forces at some distance from the area to be protected, e.g., blockades, mining, location/destruction of hostile naval combatants on the high seas. 
What Our Proposal Avoids
Part of our proposal's merit is that it avoids difficulties that plague other solutions. Finally, a review of some rarely cited portions of the
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Composite Warfare manual (29) is in order. This last reference provides for a situation precisely paralleled by our own proposal, with the sole difference being that the OTC mentioned above is named "Commander, Attack Force" in our scheme.
In In summation, the argument in favor of our proposal is three-fold.
First, our proposal has its seed in the Composite Warfare Concept manual itself; it has a doctrinal basis.
Second, our proposal addresses the critical weakness
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of task forces composed of battle groups and amphibious forces. We attempt to emplace counterweights against the centrifugal tendencies that pull these forces in different directions.
Third, our proposal avoids the pitfalls of amphibious warfare as executed in conflicts since World War II.
Instead of merely reciting history, we attempt to incorporate its lessons into our solution.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
If implemented, our proposal would require some changes in existing practices in the U.S. Navy.
Addressing these changes in detail, however, would take us beyond the intended scope of this paper. Nevertheless, a sketch of these changes is in order. 
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The CAF's Staff
Key to the smocth functioning of the entire force is a CAF staff that understands the unique environment of each of the major elements of the attack force. Accordingly, the CAF's staff must be made up of officers experienced in each warfare area: anti-air, anti-surface, anti-subsurface, and amphibious. These officers will not "represent" their areas at the CAF level, but be a true planning staff for the CAF.
CONCLUSION
We believe that our proposal offers the best solution to this issue. Yet whatever the final answer is, we hope In any event, finding a solution to this problem 9-43 remains essential to the nation's ability to project power in an uncertain and volatile world. We cannot assume that our adversaries will not exploit the ambiguous relationship that exists now between our amphibious forces and naval battle groups. We must formalize that relationship and confront our future enemies with a seamless and .ntegrated naval force. 
